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4. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, and gave him a one-page item "Amendment to CIA Section of the National Security Act of 1947" relating to section 102(d)(3) concerning protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Since he was pressed for time he told me he would look at it and call me later in the day. I also brought him up-to-date on Carl Duckett's, DDS&T, assistance to Senator Jackson and the Senate Armed Services Committee in preparation for Tuesday's Senate session, and Southern Air Transport.

Slatinshek called late in the afternoon and told me that the section on the protection of intelligence sources and methods looked good but that the House Committee will be legislating on the question of domestic activities of the Agency. He noted that Mr. Helms and others during their appearance before the Committee indicated that legislation giving some definition to Agency domestic activities might be helpful. He would appreciate ideas along this line that we could live with.

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6. (Secret - JMM) On Saturday morning I talked to Dorothy Fosdick, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and explained that we wanted to make sure that Carl Duckett's briefing of Senator Jackson in connection with the upcoming Senate debate on Trident was not interpreted as indicating the Agency was taking a partisan position on this controversial issue. She said this was fully understood and pointed out that since Senator Stennis was also attending this should solve our problem.

7. (Secret - JMM) After talking to Jack Ticer, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, and telling him of the arrangements for Duckett's briefing of Senator Jackson, and with Ticer's concurrence, I called Senator Symington's office and in the Senator's absence told Kathy Nelson that Carl Duckett would be briefing Senators Stennis and Jackson in preparation for the upcoming Trident debate but this was arranged at their request and not on our initiative. Nelson said she would explain this to the Senator.

SECRET

Amendment to CIA Section of the National Security Act of 1947

It is clear that CIA, headquartered as it is in the United States and staffed with American citizens, cannot exist without some type of domestic activities. There are a number of activities engaged in by CIA in the United States which are consistent with its foreign intelligence mission and not in contravention of the 1947 Act provision against internal security, police or subpoena powers. Examples of such activities are interviewing U.S. citizens about foreign subjects, collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners visiting the U.S., supporting CIA operations abroad from support structures within the U.S., recruiting, screening and training personnel, contracting for supplies, training foreigners in the U.S., passing foreign intelligence information to appropriate U.S. agencies, etc.

The Agency has already announced that the training of local police personnel and assistance to other U.S. agencies of the type which has recently been under attack, would only be undertaken with the Director's personal approval under most exceptional circumstances.

In connection with Watergate allegations, section 102(d)(3) of the Act could be amended to assure that the Agency would not become improperly involved in investigative or enforcement activities in the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Such an amendment could protect legitimate equities of the Agency and provide clarification of the Director's authority while at the same time draw a line beyond which the Director would not go.

The amendment would be to the third proviso in section 102 (d)(3) so that it would read as follows: [existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in brackets; new matter is underscored.]

"AND PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for [protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure] the development of plans, policies, and regulations for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and shall report to the Department of Justice for appropriate action any violation of such plans, policies and regulations."